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 MORTS POUR LA FRANCE: DO DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS ALONE EXPLAIN THE 
REGIONAL DISPARITIES OF THE GREAT WAR? 
 
Henri Gilles, Jean-Pascal Guironnet, and Antoine Parent 
 
Abstract: This article delivers the first comprehensive analysis of the new 
database, ‘Mémoire des hommes’, which gathers more than 1 Million French 
soldiers officially recognized as dead for France during WW1. Crossing this 
source with the 1911 census, we evaluate the potential numbers of recruits by 
French regional department. From this, a model identifies the factors affecting 
the number of dead. While demographic factors are the principal determinants, 
adding economic, political and locally significant factors reduces the unexplained 
variance between regions and significantly improves the explanation of the 




JEL codes: N34, N44. 
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I. Introduction 
For the authorities, the foremost problem of the Great War dead lay in responding to the 
expectations of the bereaved families. In their work Nos morts: Les sociétés occidentales face 
aux tués de la guerre, Luc Capdevila and Danièle Voldman aim to reconstruct how those 
killed and disappeared during the Great War were dealt with in material and memorial terms. 
 
No action was taken to process the dead until the autumn of 1914. The directives 
of the military hierarchy were limited to the use of the ‘pit’ grave for the rank and 
file. The general rule of the health service while on campaign was to entrust the 
burial of dead soldiers to the troops, under the control of medical officers. The 
German offensive rendered these orders obsolete: French fighters were buried by 
the enemy randomly according to circumstances, in communal pits, in scattered 
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graves, in cemeteries, without the necessary precautions for subsequent 
identification always having been taken.1 
 
The authors further report the following: 
 
The burials of fighters brought back from the front were the occasion for the first, 
big, patriotic funerals at home, in the summer of 1914. It was urgent to legislate. 
In a circular of 19 November 1914, the chief military commander forbade the 
exhumation and transportation of bodies of soldiers killed by the enemy … Faced 
with clandestine exhumations and transfers from that point onwards, the directive 
was repeated in 1915 … Preoccupied by the mass of corpses and the risks of 
infection, the public authorities envisaged organizing a large-scale incineration of 
unidentified bodies. A legal proposition to this effect was voted on 18 June 1915. 
Emotions ran high among the population. The text was rejected by the Senate on 
27 January 1916.2 
 
A service called ‘from the battlefield’ (du champ de bataille) was initiated by the civil 
authorities on 19 July 1915. Its orders included to ‘stop the practice of communal pit graves, 
to group the bodies in such a way as to avoid scattered burial sites, to bury either in individual 
graves or in groups of ten (the bodies being placed side-by-side and not on top of one 
another)’.3 The use of the ‘battlefield notebook’ (carnet du champ de bataille) was also made 
obligatory for noting the exact location of burial sites, and it was recommended that a lead 
plaque with the number recorded in the notebook be fixed to every interred body, to allow for 
the identification of bodies in the event of subsequent exhumation.4 It was not until the 
adoption of the law of 31 July 1920, and the government decree of 28 September 1920, that 
repatriation to family graves and vaults could begin. 
                                                 
1 Capdevila and Voldman, (2002), Nos morts, p. 7. All translations are the authors’ own. 
2 Ibid., pp. 78–9. 
3 Ibid., p. 80. 
4 Source: ‘Summary of the functioning of the inhumation service between 2 August 1914 and 10 January 1919’, 
Paris, 10 May 1919, National Archives, BB18-2607-1484 A 18, Ministry of War, under the office of State 
administration, General Pensions Service. 
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After the war, reclaiming the dead, particularly those who had not been identified, and 
bestowing suitable honours upon them, came to dominate the administrative channel between 
the military authorities and the families. Capdevilla and Voldman report that between ‘1921 
and 1923, 240 thousand remains were exhumed and moved all around France to be returned 
to relatives’,5 and that ‘from 1926 to 1935, 122 thousand bodies without graves were found on 
the battlefields; as to the gigantic commemorative monuments, they house the bones of the 
unidentified dead who fell on the field of honour’.6  
The question of memory thus was central to the treatment of war trauma. In this 
article, however, we focus on a different aspect of this memory: namely, the purely statistical 
dimension of losses by department. Curiously, French historians, and particularly those in the 
French tradition of the history of ideas,7 have put this issue to one side, or have broached the 
question of the total losses purely from the point of view of a critique of sources, emphasizing 
their inaccuracy and the difficulty of cross-checking. The treatment of the disappeared and the 
lack of marked graves in the first months of the war plays a central part in the contestation of 
official figures for the total number of dead. However, the quantitative history of the dead 
deserves a different treatment, and we here apply ourselves to an attempt to fill a gap in the 
literature with respect to the question: Do demographic factors alone explain the regional 
disparities in the deaths of the Great War? 
In section II we present the database used to this end; in section III we set out the 
explanatory variables; in section IV we present the results of a principal component analysis 
(PCA) carried out with respect to the variables thus identified, and the econometric steps 
adopted; sections V and VI are devoted to presenting and discussing the results of the 
modelling (the demographic model alone, and then the demographic model widened to 
include geographic, socio-economic, and political variables); section VII seeks to identify 
                                                 
5 Capdevilla and Voldman, (2002), Nos morts, p. 89. 
6 Ibid., pp. 87–8. 
7 François Cochet, (2005), Survivre au front, provides a timely reminder that in France the contemporary debate 
has been particularly polemical between the historians Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Frédéric Rousseau, and 
has sets the thesis of ‘consent’ in opposition to that of ‘constraint’. The debate concerns the question of whether 
it was patriotism or constraint that enabled soldiers to cope with conditions in the trenches. 
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possible variables hidden in the residual part not explained by our model; and the final section 
concludes.  
 
II. The Database “Mémoire des hommes”: a new database recording more than one 
million soldiers officially recognized as “Died for France” 
 
This article takes a new approach to the use of the ‘Mémoire des hommes’ (MdH) database, 
managed by the French Ministry of Defence. This database, which may be consulted on the 
ministry’s website,8 has been available to the public since 5 November 2003. It assembles in 
electronic form the death certificates9 of all the soldiers who merited the tribute ‘Mort pour la 
France’ (MPF; ‘Died For France’).10 The database may be searched by surname, first name, 
date of birth, and the regional administrative department of origin of the deceased. 
This database has considerable advantages over previous means of counting the dead 
(for example, the list of monuments to the dead, the 1978 Perchet report, and census returns), 
and constitutes a supplement to the first official statistical report of the deaths of the Great 
War, namely the Marin parliamentary report of 1921.11 It is not only exhaustive, but now 
comprises the only official, usable database of the losses of the Great War. It is precise in the 
sense that it records all those who are officially recognized as having died for France. Of 
course, it has limits: only those declared ‘MPF’ are included, to the exclusion of all those 
                                                 
8 http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/ 
9 See Appendix for an example. 
10 Official definition: MPF is an official mark of respect that must appear in death registers in the margins of 
certificates concerning soldiers killed in combat or who died of their injuries. It was instituted by the law of 2 
July 1915 to honour these deaths. It is the military authorities that decide on its attribution and determine when 
the death is noted in this way. In other cases (deaths in hospital, for example), it is up to the families to request 
attribution of this note. As A. Prost, (2008, p. 51), recalls, ‘Still today, the descendants of soldiers whom they 
feel have been forgotten (deaths in captivity or of pulmonary illness caused by gas) take this step, which explains 
why the MPF file, accessible on the internet, is not definitively complete’. 
11 This report, to which historians are not particularly attached, is nonetheless remarkable in that it attempts to 
establish, coming out of the war, a statistical evaluation of the number of deaths – that is, ‘an individual census 
of all of the losses’. The author emphasizes the necessity of recovering and consulting all of sources in order to 
identify with accuracy the exact number of war losses. For example, can all the disappearances be included 
within the deaths? In their critique of sources, historians have tended to generalize the critique that Marin 
addressed concerning the difficulties of collecting information before July 1916 to the whole of the war period. 
Let us remember that the ‘disappeared’ have still not returned a century later, and that they do indeed figure in 
the statistics of the losses of the Great War. 
 
5
whom the military authorities did not consider to merit the appellation: notably mutineers, 
suicides, those executed, those who died from illnesses not recognised during service, and 
those who died at home after discharge and whose families did not take the necessary steps to 
gain the designation (the process of updating the records continues today as and when 
requests for MPF designation are received, primarily from families). Moreover, the database 
appears to count deceased officers twice. 
A more accurate estimate of the total number of deaths in the war should therefore 
correct the overall figure for deaths classed MPF by removing the duplicates – officers 
counted twice (see table 1) – and by adding those who were refused the designation (cases of 
refusal are indicated as such by the military authorities; the number is estimated at 62 
thousand), those whose MPF status has not yet been decided (estimated at 31 thousand), those 
discharged from service during the war, and deaths outside the war period (10 thousand and 5 
thousand, respectively).12 
As the ‘exact’ figure for the total number of war dead is not the topic of this article, 
and indeed continues to be a subject of polemical debate, we deliberately limit ourselves to 
the MPF designation in order to identify the geographical origins of the war dead.13 Thus, 
geographical origin under the categories ‘refused MPF’, ‘not decided’, and ‘discharged’ is not 
                                                 
12 These figures are estimates that come from the management of the database. 
13 The polemic over the figures essentially revolves around the number of deaths from the war (and not in the 
war, for which the MdH source today seems to be irrefutable). The main statistical uncertainties over the number 
of dead come from the treatment and evaluation of the number of wounded and ill. This problem is beyond the 
scope of our study. By choosing MdH as a source, we save ourselves the difficulty of cross-checking the number 
of dead with that of the injured or evacuated. A major difficulty arises as soon as we seek to undertake cross-
referencing on the basis of different sources (medical or military) on the injured: in any case, the MPF source 
provides an indisputable official source ‘which notably does not include deaths from illnesses not attributable to 
service, 75,000’ according to A. Prost, p. 57. But, as this same author goes on to mention (p. 60), ‘included in the 
list of monuments are those of the temple, the church, the town hall. Each institution is determined to make 
public the list of its dead. Represented in these lists, and there to be written or re-written, is an issue for many 
families, as is witnessed by the case of the executed, for example, some of whom were counted immediately by 
communes among their war dead, whereas others have waited to be exonerated for their names to be added to the 
monument … The question of ‘how many’ was posed long after that of ‘who’ … for the contemporaries, what 
was important was not the balance sheet of the war, it was that none of the dead be forgotten or excluded … .’ 
We have chosen to deal with the question of regional disparities on the basis of MPF status, which identifies 
deaths in the war and allows us to avoid ‘polluting’ the figures for the deaths in the war with another question, 
that of deaths from the war; a question that is just as legitimate but which introduces biases in the counting of 
deaths in the war. 
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dealt with, as their files are not accessible via the MdH database. We limit our study to 
official cases of MPF, and thus seek to determine whether the geographical disparities before 
death of the MPFs may be explained solely by demographic factors. Despite these constraints, 
our ‘survey’ nonetheless includes 1,187,143 MPFs across all of the metropolitan departments, 
excepting that the eastern departments, such as Alsace and the Moselle, are not distinguished 
in the MdH database. 
Following this approach, the first statistical analysis (table 1) presents the distribution 
of the number of deaths by region according to the total male population. To our knowledge, 
this is the first time this statistic has been published. For legibility, and in order to bring out 
the results for the reader, these data are presented in the body of the text by region (there are 
nineteen of them, including what we call ‘historic Brittany’, corresponding to the 
contemporary administrative region of Brittany, plus the contemporary department of Loire-
Atlantique, which is thus excluded from ‘Pays de Loire’; and an amalgamated Upper and 
Lower Normandy, which, for the purposes of this research, constitutes a single region for the 
same historical reason). 
In general terms, surveying the number of deaths by region relative to the total 
population shows that the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) region is least affected, 
together with Île de France, and in contrast to Limousin. However, this first result remains 
imprecise given that the proportion of men to women varies between regions. In reporting the 
number of deaths in the male population, we notice, for example, that the Corsica region (see 
the evolution of the hierarchy according to different indicators) has a lower proportion of men 









Table 1. Proportion of Dead Number by Regions 
Regions Number of dead Rank
% of dead 
 among the 
population 
Rank % of dead among males Rank
Pays de la Loire 62631 (9) 3,76 (3) 7,76 (3) 
Limousin 37101 (17) 3,86 (1) 8,24 (1) 
Bretagne Historique 125073 (1) 3,82 (2) 8,02 (2) 
Corse 9836 (19) 3,38 (7) 7,73 (4) 
Aquitaine 70271 (7) 3,11 (14) 6,55 (14) 
Midi-Pyrénées 72148 (6) 3,37 (8) 7,03 (8) 
Nord Pas de Calais 84421 (4) 2,77 (17) 6,18 (17) 
Île de France 113615 (2) 2,13 (18) 4,86 (18) 
PACA 40939 (15) 2,11 (19) 4,97 (19) 
Rhône Alpes 109846 (3) 3,07 (15) 6,44 (15) 
Picardie 45944 (12) 3,15 (13) 6,63 (13) 
Auvergne 50368 (11) 3,45 (6) 7,25 (6) 
Champagne 
Ardenne 38832 (16) 3,21 (12) 6,75 (12) 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 45227 (13) 2,96 (16) 6,30 (16) 
Normandie 79490 (5) 3,34 (9) 7,02 (9) 
Poitou-Charentes 43756 (14) 3,32 (10) 6,75 (11) 
Centre 67248 (8) 3,59 (4) 7,33 (5) 
Bourgogne 55089 (10) 3,54 (5) 7,24 (7) 
Franche Comté 30292 (18) 3,32 (11) 7,01 (10) 
Overall 1187143 3,10 6,62  
Source: « MdH »  Database  and Census 1911. 
 
Table 1 suggests that we should not be too hasty in passing comment on the number of 
deaths, since discrepancies could, in reality, be accounted for simply by a difference in the 
characteristics of the regional populations. We have thus chosen to take account of the age 
pyramid, which might also differ by region, so allowing us to calculate the number of 
potential recruits per region. 
This latter figure has thus been extrapolated from the 1911 census data (age pyramid 
by department, proportion of men). Furthermore, we note in our study that there is a lower 
than expected mortality rate (once the mortality figures are seen in relation to the total 
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population of the department) in the departments of south-east France.14 One of the 
explanations we advance for this is that the low mortality is linked, in part, to the significant 
proportion of foreigners not mobilized for French military service (notably Italians in the 
departments of the south-east). Using the 1911 census data, we have thus taken foreign 
nationals living in France out of the number of potential recruits (in the active categories) in 
all of the French departments (principally, Italians in Provence; Spaniards in Aquitaine; and 
Belgians, Polish, and Germans in the departments of the north and east). The last column of 
table 2 takes account of this correction and gives the number of MPF in relation to the number 
of potential French recruits aged 19–27 years by department; again, a statistic that to our 
knowledge has never before been published. 
According to table 2, Île de France appears to be the least affected region, in contrast to 
Limousin, confirming the results of table 1. However, Pays de la Loire seems to be just as 
strongly affected, whereas historic Brittany now shows a rate nearer the average, contrary to 
the statistics presented in table 1. It thus seems that if we stick to descriptive statistics alone, 
uncertainty remains regarding which regions have the greatest and which the lowest mortality 
rates. Moreover, there are significant differences between the different classes of tables 1 and 
2, according to the different criteria taken into account. Consequently, in this article we 
undertake an econometric analysis to remove this ambiguity and determine the factors 
influencing the number of deaths. Furthermore, the intra-regional heterogeneities may bias the 
analysis. Nonetheless, the standard errors of rates of dead within French regions reveal a 
slight intra-regional variance. Thus, regions seem to be very homogenous, except South-east 
areas (PACA and Languedoc-Roussillon) which have bordering areas or south areas 
exhibiting higher rates of dead than their interior areas.15 Therefore, we present for the sake of 
clarity, our results at a regional level without loss of information, since the intra-regional 




                                                 
14 We use the term high (or low) mortality when the number of deaths is greater than (or, respectively, below) a 
proportional figure based on demographic characteristics. 




Table 2. Potential recruits and number of dead by regions 

















Pays de la 
Loire 62631 (9) 120704 120388 52,02% 0.003 (1) 
Limousin 37101 (17) 72329 72201 51,39% 0.001 (3) 
Bretagne 
Historique 125073 (1) 276482 275962 45,32% 0.001 (11) 
Corse 9836 (19) 25222 23596 41,69% 0.000 (16) 
Aquitaine 70271 (7) 160037 154243 45,56% 0.003 (9) 
Midi-Pyrénées 72148 (6) 143113 140097 51,50% 0.002 (2) 
Nord Pas de 
Calais 84421 (4) 257887 226527 37,27% 0.000 (17) 
Île de France 113615 (2) 349003 313616 36,23% 0.000 (18) 
PACA 40939 (15) 142994 97628 41,93% 0.009 (15) 
Rhône Alpes 109846 (3) 265563 254999 43,08% 0.005 (14) 
Picardie 45944 (12) 106308 102892 44,65% 0.000 (13) 
Auvergne 50368 (11) 107541 107073 47,04% 0.000 (8) 
Champagne 
Ardenne 38832 (16) 85570 80129 48,46% 0.001 (16) 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 45227 (13) 108633 100939 44,81% 0.010 (12) 
Normandie 79490 (5) 176648 175083 45,40% 0.001 (10) 
Poitou-
Charentes 43756 (14) 102782 102464 47,60% 0.001 (6) 
Centre 67248 (8) 135474 134975 49,82% 0.001 (4) 
Bourgogne 55089 (10) 116025 115093 47,86% 0.000 (5) 
Franche-
Comté 30292 (18) 69290 64382 47,05% 0.007 (7) 
Overall 1187143 2821605 2662287 44,59% 0.002  





III. Explanatory variables 
This section presents the variables that are used in our statistical analysis. We can classify 
these into four categories: demographic, geographic, economic, and political variables. We 
also discuss other statistical sources used in the construction of these indicators. 
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The dependent variable in our analysis is the number of deaths per department. This is 
a variable that allows for numerical analysis. If, instead of the number of deaths, we use a 
ratio relating this variable to another indicator, this raises the problem of the pertinence of the 
chosen ratio: Should it relate to the number of deaths in a department in terms of its surface 
area, its total male population, or only to the number of potential recruits?16 It seemed 
essential to address this problem in a manner that would capture the population size effect in 
all of its (albeit only roughly perceived) dimensions. 
The first, commonsense, idea is to attempt to connect the number of deaths by 
department to its demographic make-up. We have thus sought, on the basis of the model 
which is most appropriate for this effect (a count model), to test the significance of the 
hypothesized demographic factors as a primary cause of the death rate per department. To this 
end, in our first model, two variables are used: the number of potential recruits per department 
and the population density of the department. These two indicators allow us to capture the 
influence of the two key demographic factors, before explaining the number of deaths in the 
department, the age effect of the population of the department, and the size effect of the 
population of the department. 
A more traditional indicator would have been the ratio of recruitable men per km²; however, 











      (1) 
 
the first ratio (‘rate of recruitable men’) is an indicator of the age pyramid and of the 
proportion of men in the department, whereas the second is indicative of an effect of the 
density of the population.17 If the first ratio is an indicator that is relative to the demography 
                                                 
16 An estimate of this ratio was made, but this did not, however, issue in fruitful results. One of the reasons 
probably comes from the weak variance of this ratio for the majority of regions. 
17 The switch to the logarithm ensures the additive form of the estimated functional form. 
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of the department, this analysis allows us to take account of the additional effects through the 
second ratio, since the latter can, therefore, include the effects of measurement errors in the 
calculation of recruitable men (i.e. those not captured by this variable) as well as potential 
voluntary recruitment captured by the population density ratio. 
There are, in effect, historical reasons for the decision to introduce this second 
demographic variable; the Marin Report discusses the recruitment drive in these terms: 
 
Besides recruited men, there were adolescents, discharged men and old men: in all 
the ranks and until the end of the war, the most involving examples were given. 
Must we, for example, cite all those who signed up through deception… ? Signed-
up youth were not only innumerable at the start, but the call-up proceedings up 
until the end of the war were so considerable that in the calculations of probable 
manpower, it was necessary to discount the high number of signed-up men from 
the next calls.18 
 
After having tested the demographic causes as a primary explanation of the number of 
deaths by department, our proposal was to consider criteria other than strictly demographic 
ones and to add them in order to enrich the model. 
The ‘geographical’ variables used – ‘distance from the front’ and ‘from the border’ – 
were supposed to reflect in part the indications of the distance of the departments from the 
combat zones, it being understood that in the early period of the war, this variable was highly 
pertinent. As Antoine Prost recalls: 
 
A major distinction was made between the zone of the armies and that of the 
interior. The zone of the armies was much greater than that of the fighting: in 
April 1917, for example, Orléans and Provins were part of the zone of the armies 
                                                 
18 Marin (1921, p. 60). 
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and not that of the interior. In the zone of the armies, a distinction was made 
between the zone of the front, that of the staging posts, and that of the rearguard.19 
 
Our variable ‘proximity’ thus equals 1 when the department is in the ‘zone of the 
armies’, and 0 when in the ‘zone of the interior’ (see table A1 in the appendix). 
In the famous ‘Plan XVII’, conceived prior to 1914, a pre-determined order of battle 
was fixed by the French military high command, distributing the regional regiments across the 
zones of the front in the event of hostilities with Germany. The principle guiding this 
distribution was the criterion of proximity, with the regiments stationed in the regions 
bordering the conflict zones being the first to be sent to these zones. This criterion must have 
lost its relevance in due course as the priority of high command came to be to make up for the 
losses incurred by the regiments at the front. In addition to the variable ‘distance from the 
front’, it seems to us that particular attention must have been paid to border regions distant 
from the conflict zones. 
The ‘rural’ factor seemed to us to deserve a place of its own. It is widely held that the 
Great War took the greatest contribution from the most rural zones, and introducing a variable 
for the rural character of the department allows us to appreciate this impact. Also introduced 
in this analysis are the economic variables by department, extracted from the 1911 census 
data. This puts us in a position to ask such questions as: Was there a desire to ‘protect’ certain 
categories of the population more than others? Was there discrimination according to social 
position, whether against agricultural labourers, workers, or bosses? 
These questions seem to us to be pertinent since, in the Marin Report, which is based 
on the 1911 census, information appears on losses per social category. To our knowledge, this 
data has not been reworked on a statistical basis since its original publication.20 Using an 
                                                 
19 Prost, (2008, pp. 44–5). 
20 Le Dictionnaire de la Grande Guerre presents the following figures in the article ‘Economie de guerre’: ‘From 
mid-1916 to the end of the war, around 500 thousand men were mobilized in the factories; between July 1917 
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analysis by Jean Rey based on the French censuses of 1906 and 1911, the author of the Marin 
report studied the proportion of adult workers in each social category which supplied 
servicemen. In fact, this lends itself to a counterfactual exercise: the ‘proportion of recruited 
men at the start of the war’ is sub-classified into eight professional categories, namely 
agriculture, industry, business, domestic service, liberal professions, mines and quarries, 
public services, transportation.21 As the Marin report notes, 
 
If each social category had been mobilized on a pro rata basis, the proportion of 
recruited men would have been indicated in the distribution of the population by 
social category, but it was not so … Two categories in particular, public services 
and transportation, were not completely mobilized. We can estimate the 
contingent that was provided by these two categories at only 35 per cent, that is 
765,000 men, whereas they would have been expected to provide 1,368,000 
servicemen. The difference between these two figures must have been made up by 
the other professions at the start of the war.22 
 
While the Marin report suggests that the greatest contribution of servicemen came 
from the agricultural professions, it also notes that industry and business were not spared: 
these sectors were also called upon to compensate for the deficit of recruits from the 
categories of ‘transportation’ and ‘public services’. 
                                                                                                                                                        
and November 1918, mobilized agricultural workers rose from 130 thousand to over 300 thousand. In 
administration and public services (railways), manpower reached 350 thousand from 1917. In the navy and 
navigation, it was nearly 100 thousand.’ For his part, J. Becker (1988, p. 53), notes, ‘It was on 20 September 
1914 that the new War Minister, Millerand, gave industrialists the goal of producing 100 thousand shells a day. 
The State poured in advances to enable industrialists to equip themselves, to build new factories. This enabled 
them to meet the targets set in the summer of 1915. To take but one example, the Toulouse gunpowder factory, 
which employed 100 workers before the war, employed 4 thousand of them from June 1915, 20 thousand in June 
1917, and 30 thousand at the time of the armistice. Where did they find this workforce? Naturally, industrialists 
claimed that they should be given recruited workers at the start. A worker was more important in his post than in 
the fighting. At the end of 1915, around 500 thousand workers were sent to the armament factories.’ 
21 The Marin Report, (1921, p. 51), compares the actual percentages of servicemen for each of eight separate, 
professional categories (respectively and in the order given above: 45.3; 29.44; 10.6; 0.3; 2.62; 2.11; 2.78; 6.85) 
with the actual distribution (in %) of the total male population across these eight categories according to the 
1911 census (respectively 41.4; 26.95; 9.71; 0.27; 2.45; 1.95; 5.06; 12.2). 
22 Marin (1921, p. 51). 
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Thus, considered in general terms, the Marin Report sheds light on the debate over the 
war effort demanded from different populations. The result is an ensemble of balanced 
remarks which tends to underscore the fact that the will to preserve or reserve certain 
categories for the industrial armament effort could undermine morale, in a context of rhetoric 
of a ‘sacred union’, and strong ‘consent’ to go to the front to fight: 
 
A great effort was made to maintain overall manpower, particularly during 1917, 
while protecting military needs from the pressure of economic needs. From April 
1917 to January 1918, this effort allowed only 300 thousand farmers to return to 
the land, 32 thousand men to mines, 3 thousand men to marine activities, 5 
thousand men to teaching, 8 thousand men to the railways. From January to 
November 1918, the collapse of the Russian front made considerable numbers of 
troops available to the enemy, and before the arrival en masse of the Americans, 
an effort had to be made to enlist 260 thousand men.23 
 
This development gives a nuanced response to the claim that there were protected 
professions. However, it also motivates pressing forward with an analysis in order to 
determine whether the distribution of deaths by department might have been influenced by the 
socio-professional make-up of those departments. 
In a paragraph on ‘The preservation of men for military service despite national 
needs’, the Marin Report discusses arguments that play down the idea that economic motives 
alone might have determined the profile of recruitment:  
 
The necessity of dedicating all the possible efforts of the active population to the 
war was so passionately accepted that errors were made in the preservation from 
military service of more useful men, even for national defence, in the strict sense, 
in other fields. It was this noble sentiment that wrongly pushed back the moment 
when the workers necessary for the manufacture of weapons were returned to the 
                                                 
23 Marin (1921, p. 61). 
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war factories … It was late in the day when many heads of households or men, 
having already had several brothers or sons killed, benefited from some measure 
of protection … It was only when the agricultural problem became critical that 
some men were returned to the land … By contrast with other countries, no 
measure was taken for the liberal professions.24 
 
In addition to this, there was one political variable which seemed particularly relevant 
to test by department – namely, to find out whether certain departments that we classify as 
‘anti-militaristic’ (as measured by a vote for the extreme left25 that is higher than average for 
French departments) might have been penalized in the fighting. This is a thesis which is aired 
periodically. In assessing it, we must appreciate the importance of contextualizing these 
allegations, noting in particular that the political climate at the beginning of the twentieth 
century in France was far from calm,26 and that the question of the link between mutineers 
and the pacifist movement has been the subject of intense debate by historians. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the battle cry of Republicans was the 
struggle against clericalism: ‘The great reform that is the separation [of the Church from the 
State] is the greatest that has been attempted in our country since the French Revolution’.27 As 
Becker has commented, ‘The victory of the anticlericalists, the Dreyfusards (the exoneration 
of Dreyfus by the Supreme Court of Appeal on 12 July 1906), and the establishment of the 
radical republic provoked in response a reaction around a new nationalism that Clémenceau 
denigrates with the label, the new alliance of the sabre and the aspergillum’.28 The 1913 
proposition to increase the duration of military service to three years provoked an 
                                                 
24 Ibid., p. 62. 
25 It is in this manner that the SFIO vote is indicated on the political map of France from 1875 to 1914. 
26 As Becker recalls in La France en guerre (1988), Jaurès is the object of permanent outrage: Jaurès fought a 
duel against Déroulède who had described him as ‘the most odious perverter of conscience that had ever, in 
France, played the game of the foreigner’ (p. 12). Charles Mauras, ‘L’action française’, 18 July 1914: ‘Everyone 
knows Mr Jaurès is Germany’. Charles Péguy: ‘Right from the declaration of war, the first thing we will do will 
be to shoot Jaurès. We will not leave these traitors behind us to stab us in the back’ (comment reported by 
Romain Rolland in his Journal des années de guerre, Albin Michel, pp. 31–2.) 
27 Jaurès, La Dépêche, 30 April 1905. 
28 Becker, (1988), La France en guerre, p. 16. 
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impassioned debate that rekindled the opposition between the same two camps as were set 
against each other in the Dreyfus affair. 
This France of two camps (the teacher and the priest) certainly had an unsavoury side: 
‘Unionism professed anti-militarism and anti-patriotism and announced its intention to 
sabotage the call-up if necessary, to the point that a device of repression known by the name 
of “Carnet B” [Notebook B] was enacted. [In the socialist party], a minority assembled 
around Gustave Hervé courted the same themes’.29 This forgotten or misunderstood point 
justifies introducing a political variable into our workings. 
 
Nearly two thousand people, anarchists, unionists, as well as some socialists, were 
classed as likely to attempt to block the call-up and were listed on what was called 
the ‘Carnet B’30 (). Would one apply the carnet B? The Minister of the Interior, 
Louis Malvy, thought that it was not necessary. His decision was not enacted 
without difficulty: firstly, despite ministerial orders, arrests took place, 
particularly in Nord-Pas de Calais, and then it was necessary to overcome some 
opposition, such as that of Clémenceau … Overall, however, the percentage of 
these attitudes was more or less negligible.31 
 
Even though the declaration of war put an end to overt political cleavage, along with 
the development of the theme of ‘scared union’, supposed to symbolize national unity during 
the war,32 clearly this does not stop us testing the impact of this political variable on the 
distribution of deaths in France, especially given the emergence during the war of the 
phenomenon of mutinies, the political nature of which has been a point of serious contestation 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 17. 
30 Jean-Jacques Becker, Le Carnet B, Klincksieck, 1973 
31 Ibid., p. 28. 
32 President Raymond Poincaré made the famous remark: ‘in the war in which it is involved, France still be 
heroically defended by all its sons; in front of the enemy, nothing will shatter the sacred union’. Becker, La 
France en guerre, p. 29: ‘The most symbolic event of this sacred union was perhaps the funeral of Jaurès on 4 
Aug. He who was a target for outrage less than three weeks before, was transformed into a national hero: the 
public authorities were there but also the representatives of nationalist organisations, Maurice Barrès, the 




by historians. For François Cochet and Rémy Porte, in their Dictionary of the Great War 
1914–18, it is a theme that is radical but not taboo (which need not stop us shedding some 
statistical light on the subject). Reference is made to two works, by Guy Pedroncini33 and by 
Denis Rolland,34 both of which are based on deep research in the military archives, and both 
of which seek to analyse the political dimension of these mutinies. These authors draw up a 
list of the collective movements in the trenches which seemed to emerge from 1916 onwards 
– that is, well before the Nivelle offensive, considered the catalyst for such movements – and 
insist on their diversity. Regarding the political interpretation of these events, Cochet and 
Porte perceive the outlines of a consensus as emerging in the literature: 
 
Even if the Internationale was sung and red flags were raised in several places, 
these external signs of revolt do not in themselves prove the existence of a 
revolutionary organization. These were symbols, recreational expressions, much 
more than revealing indicators … In the end, by way of appeasement, Pétain 
acknowledged that the soldiers had rights, the right to rest, to material benefits 
(food and bedding) and right information on the operations in progress 
(conversations with officers). This contributed to the extinction of the 
movement.35 
 
What was the extent of the repression? It is pertinent to underline that the number of 
death sentences was radically reduced by the President of the Republic, exercising his right to 
bestow grace (412 men had officially been condemned to death). This deserves to be 
investigated more closely. The number of death sentences carried out (due to the exercise of 
grace) may be a poor indicator of the depth of the movement, in the sense that it 
underestimates its intensity. Accordingly, we here make new use of the statistics provided by 
the Marin Report on the sentences pronounced by the war councils as recorded in the Tribunal 
                                                 
33 Pedronici, (1987), ‘Les mutineries de 1917 dans l’armée française’. 
34 Rolland, (2005), La grève des tranchées. 
35 Cochet and Porte, (2008), ‘Mutineries’. 
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de Ressort (regional data),36 allowing us to cross-check this information with our department-
based analysis. 
In sum, the reasons put forward (political cleavage before the war, mutinies) justify testing 
the relevance of a politically indicative variable, a proxy for the ‘sanctions against anti-
militarist departments’, that would be indicative of a military high command that was still 
largely anti-Dreyfusard at the outset of the hostilities.37 The data analysis presented below 
provides a first component of the response regarding the necessity of not limiting the 
explanatory variables to demographic variables alone.  
 
IV.Principal Component Analysis and count models 
 
By way of a preamble to the econometric model, the first part of this section gives an analysis 
of the data, in order to unpack the primary determining factors of the number of deaths. The 
latter part details the econometric model used. 
The factor analysis presented below explains on two axes over 80 per cent of the 
inertia of the regions. The x-axis, explaining 45 per cent of the variance, distinguishes an 
effect of the ‘number of recruitable men’, which thus comes out as a determining factor. This 
axis is positively correlated with the proportion of the active population in agriculture, with 
youth, and with the surface area of the department. The position of Corsica is explained by its 
having a small population, and so, indirectly, a low population of eligible recruits, added to an 
obviously small surface area. By contrast, the Rhône-Alpes region is characterised by a large 
surface area, and has a young and predominantly agricultural population. As a consequence, 
the regions with the highest density of eligible recruits are located in the middle of this axis 
(Île de France). Historic Brittany has a lower proportion of deaths per km2 since the region is 
                                                 
36 Marin, (1921, p. 63). 
37 François Mauriac, (1960), Le nouveau Bloc-notes, p. 349, underlines the permanence of the ideological 
fracture after the Dreyfus affair: ‘Today we know that the Affair was not an accident, that the two spiritual 
families that drew up one against the other did not cease to confront one another’. 
 
19
evidently far more extensive than Île de France, even though it has a greater total number of 
deaths. 
The regions that recorded the greatest number of war deaths (in absolute terms) are 
ordered along the y-axis, since this figure is positively correlated with the number of deaths in 
the land and sea armies, with the number of residents in the regions, as well as with the 
number of mutinies. In other words, this axis reflects the size effect: the regions with the 
largest populations are those that have the greatest number of deaths (contrary to the 
descriptive statistics on related data given in tables 1 and 2). From these figures, it would 
seem that among the regions with the largest populations, the regions of the north were more 
affected than those of the south. 
Figure 1. PCA 
 
 Source: « MdH » database and Census 1911. 
 
The correlation of the number of mutineers with the preceding variables merits 
attention, although this variable is ambiguous because it captures two dimensions – politics 
and ‘brutality of fighting’ – which are difficult to dissociate. In addition, there is a difficulty 
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of a statistical nature: the data on mutinies from the Tribunal de Ressort give information on a 
regional and not strictly departmental basis, which means that this variable cannot be used as 
a basis for statistical tests. Moreover, this variable may be influenced by individual factors 
other than political convictions. Having only the number of mutineers at the regional level and 
taking account of the possible endogeneity of this variable, the latter is only used as a political 
proxy in the principal components analysis (PCA). The factor analysis seems to corroborate 
the effect of the brutality of fighting, since the mutinies are positively correlated with the 
number of deaths. For these reasons, we favor the “extreme left” vote by department as the 
relevant political variable. 
Overall, the factor analysis suggests that a population density effect and a 
geographical location effect seem to be predominant in the explanation of the number of 
deaths. Moreover, the criterion of ‘rurality’ allows us to distinguish between regions. The 
PCA also reveals a certain asymmetry: while the most affected regions, in absolute terms, are 
clearly distinguished, it is more difficult to distinguish between the more ‘protected’ regions, 
such as those of the centre and south of France. 
Let us assume, then, that the number of events arising at the level of the statistical unit 
is both discrete and random. The counting of this number of events (hypergeometric law) can 
be approximated using Poisson’s law. Let Y be a random variable that obeys Poisson’s law 






y      (2) 
with the following relation between the mean and the variance: var(y) = E(y) = μ. In the case 
of the application of Poisson’s law to n French regions, we hypothesize that the numbers of 
deaths arising in these regions are n independent realizations y1, y2, … , yn of a random 
variable of Poisson’s law Y, with parameter μ = (μ1 … μn), conditioned by the explanatory 
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The link between the expectancy μi and the linear combination of the explanatory 
variables and the estimated coefficients usually used is the Napierian logarithm. Poisson’s 








i      (4) 
However, in the majority of cases, adjusting Poisson’s model to a data set does not 
respect the hypothesis of a variance equal to expectancy.38 If the estimated variances based on 
the results of the model are greater than the estimated averages, this suggests that there has 
been over-dispersion. This can be due, for example, to the omission of an explanatory variable 
or to the non-homogeneity of the environment. 
Certain models allow us to take account of over-dispersion, in particular the Negative 
Binominal (NB) model and the Generalized Poisson (GP) model. To take account of the over-
dispersion as well as the influence of explanatory variables on this over-dispersion, the 
simplest method is to estimate the parameter of over-dispersion θ by comparing the deviance 
of the model (or the sum of the Pearson residuals) with the number of degrees of freedom.39 










    (5) 
The law of the negative binominal model can be seen as a mixture of Poisson’s law 
and the law of Gamma. Notably, this mixture corresponds to the hypothesis of Poissonian 
intra-regional variability combined with an inter-regional variability manifesting a Gamma 
distribution of a parameter of form k. 








ii     (6)
 
In both cases, the variance is from then on proportional to the mean (softening the 
initial hypothesis of Poisson’s law). The estimates of the two models often lead to very 
similar estimates.40 A second difficulty in the counting models comes from the value zero for 
                                                 
38 McCullagh and Nelder, (1989). 
39 That is, the number of observations minus the number of estimated parameters. 
40 For comparative purposes, both models will be estimated. 
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a significant number of statistical units (‘zero events’). However, since in our analysis no 
region has had no deaths, we will not broach this problem. 
 
V.Econometric Results of the Demographic Model 
Table 3 presents the results of the model constrained by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
NB, and GP. First impressions are that the data follow a normal distribution, since the OLS 
gives better results than the other models. As the explained variable has a raised average, 
Poisson’s law and the Negative Binominal law both converge in the direction of a normal 
distribution. 
The specification of the models in table 3 tests the hypothesis that the number of 
deaths by department is explained exclusively by the demographic variables, that is, is 
proportional to the number of potential recruits41 and to the population density of the 
department. This hypothesis is verified since the relationship with these two variables is 
positive and clearly significant. The proportion of potential recruits greatly increases the 
number of deaths in the department: it is young males who absorb the impact of the war. The 
population density translates a size effect of department population, and its impact is logically 
less than the number of recruits since it takes account of all the effects not taken into account 
by the ratio of recruitable men. The constant here represents the minimum number of deaths 
by department. 
However, while these results are significant, we observe that the dispersion in the 
number of deaths according to departments θ is also significant. Despite having taken account 
of these two demographic variables, there remain important significant differences between 
the number of deaths observed and those predicted by this model.  
In order to distinguish the regions that do not follow this demographic process, we 
have regressed the residuals of this model by including a fixed effect for each region. Since 
                                                 
41 Calculated from the 1911 census, which gives the total population of the department by age range. The 




demographic reasons explain the majority of the variance in the number of deaths, we have 
chosen wider thresholds of significance (5, 10, and 20 per cent). 
 
 
Table 3. OLS and Count Model (constrained model) 
  OLS NB GP 
AIC 79.2 1593.18 1593.18 
BIC 81.5 1602.81 1602.81 
Intercept 7.001*** 7.154*** 7.154*** 
Rate of Potential Recruits 0.280*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 
Density 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
θ - 0.097*** 0.097*** 
Regions Obs. Dead Predicted by OLS Unexplained Dead (%)
Pays de la Loire (+) 62631 49218 21.42 
Bretagne Historique (+) 125073 103561 17.20 
Aquitaine (++) 70271 52222 25.68 
PACA (+) 40939 48709 -18.98 
Franche Comté (+++) 30292 49386 -63.03 
Note: * significant to 10%, ** significant to 5%, *** significant to 1%. (+)significant to 20%,(++) significant to 10%, 
(+++)significant to 5%.  
Source: « MdH » database and Census 1911. 
 
 
Among the nineteen regions, the demographic model provides an estimate very close 
to the number of deaths observed for fourteen of them. Only five regions deviate more 
strongly from this demographic model: Pays de la Loire, historic Brittany, Aquitaine, 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA), and Franche-Comté (the two last ones seem to have 
been relatively spared). Franche-Comté, a more densely populated region, should have had a 
greater number of deaths according to our demographic model: Was voluntary inscription 
therefore lower?42 On the other hand, Pays de la Loire, historic Brittany, and Aquitaine seem 
to have paid a heavier price than that foreseen by demographic criteria alone. Is the feeling of 
sacrifice in these regions – something which is still perceptible today – therefore justified? 
Alternatively, can we trace the higher death rate in these regions back to other explanatory 
factors? In the next section we develop these thoughts further. 
 
                                                 
42 The number of mutineers observed in this region (see table A3) seems to confirm this hypothesis. 
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VI. Econometric Results of the model including demographic, geographic, economic and 
political variables 
In order to explain the persistence of these differences, it is necessary to look to factors other 
than the purely demographic. To this end, we have introduced the following explanatory 
variables in a second model: Proximity, Border, Sailors,43 Employers (regions with a strong 
fabric of ‘small employers and self-employed’), Unemployment Rate, and Farmers (see table 
A1 in the appendix for a description of the variables). 
The introduction of these six additional variables allows us to halve the percentage of 
the number of deaths not explained, without affecting the impact of the demographic variables 
already highlighted. At the same time, the introduction of these variables allows us to better 
explain the variability in the number of deaths between departments, since the distribution 
coefficient reduces significantly. The OLS is better suited here than the NBIN and GPOIS 
specifications, and has fewer residuals and a better information criterion (AIC and BIC). 
Following Box and Tidwell,44 all the variables show a linear relation with the dependent 
variable, with the exception of the variable ‘Sailors’ (see discussion below). 
In terms of our analysis, it emerges that those from a professional background of 
‘small employers and self-employed’ were more protected than those from a working class 
background. Small employers and craftsmen45 were able to benefit from both a better network 
of social relations, which allowed them to escape recruitment, and from the deliberate 
decision on the part of the authorities to protect economic activity amid the war effort. The 
unemployment rate is here used as an indicator of economic activity. Regions with strong 
economic activity (that is, the regions with low unemployment rates) seem to have been 
spared compared to the others. Similarly, the most rural regions (those with the greatest share 
                                                 
43 Half of sailor deaths come from the departments of Brittany; nonetheless, this factor (being involved in the 
navy) ‘protected’, because the death rate in this wing was much lower than in the infantry. 
44 Box and Tidwell, (1962). 
45 This variable does not capture an age effect. Small employers and self-employed do not necessarily include 
older people.  
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of agricultural professions) show a larger proportion of war deaths than regions where 
industrial workers dominate. This reveals the authorities’ preference for protecting industrial 
activity during the period of hostilities. Industrial activity was supported in order to feed the 
war effort. 
At the level of deaths per department, our results corroborate the overall data on losses 
per profession pointed to in the Marin Report with respect to the ‘Distribution of losses [by 
social category] for each period of the war’: 
 
First period: 1 August 1914–1 December 1915: The losses were spread between 
social categories according to the proportion of each profession at the time of the 
call-up. 
Second period: 1 December 1915–31 December 1916: At this time, there were 
2,800 thousand fighters at the front, of whom 500 thousand workers and 50 
thousand miners were taken. As the number of fighters remained constant, it was 
necessary for the other professions to compensate this reduction in manpower. 
During this second period, the losses were distributed in the following 
proportions: farmers 58.32 per cent; industry 11.59 per cent; liberal professions 
3.37 per cent; transportation 8.8 per cent. 
Third period: the year 1917: 180 thousand farmers; 40 thousand factory workers, 
40 thousand railway workers were temporarily withdrawn from military service 
and taken out of the army zone to facilitate the acceleration of transportation, 
notably that which affected the American army. There were 2,900 thousand men 
at the front. The losses were divided among the following professions: agriculture 
52.9 per cent; industry 10.2 per cent; business 19.4 per cent; liberal professions 
4.78 per cent; transportation 7.42 per cent. 
Fourth period: the year 1918: At the beginning of 1918, 20 thousand more 
industrial workers were taken out of the army zone, along with 27 thousand 
transport workers and 13 thousand miners. The contingent of the latter was nearly 
reduced to zero.46 
 
                                                 
46 Marin (1921, page 51). 
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The report then recapitulates the total losses per social category:  
 
It is noted, in the final analysis, that agriculture lost 673,700 men; industry, 
267,400; business, 196,720; liberal professions, 71,070; public services, 55,240; 
transportation, 99,240. The liberal professions lost 71,070 dead … whereas 
[according to] the percentage of their profession within the nation they would only 
have given 34,000. They lost more than double the number they should have lost 
and so they sacrificed nothing but having over 33 per cent of their members killed. 
Agriculture lost 17.5 per cent more than its expected percentage, that is, 673,700 
instead of 573,000.47 
 
Pursuing a different line of thought, we notice that the regions farthest from the front 
(by contrast with the more northerly regions – and excepting those situated in the combat 
zone, such as those of the north or east which were under German control) were more 
protected in terms of deaths than the others: this phenomenon must undoubtedly have been 
more marked at the start of the hostilities (as a consequence of the dispersal of troops on the 
chessboard according to ‘Plan XVII’) rather than later. We also notice that the border regions 
(notably Franche-Comté on the border of Switzerland, a neutral country) benefitted from a 
comparative advantage relative to other French regions. 
Finally, two additional factors (somewhat less significant that the preceding ones) may 
also be able to refine the analysis. Firstly, the coastal regions (of historic Brittany in 
particular) seem to have been less affected than the regions of the interior, since the square 
root of the ‘sailors’ variable is significant and positive. This function indicates that the more a 
department mobilizes in the navy, the greater the reduction in the proportion of deaths. This 
result confirms the historical narrative presented above, namely that the death rate in the navy 
was 7.4 per cent compared with 17 per cent for the land army.48 Secondly, and in keeping 
with the results of the PCA, proximity to the combat zone is a factor which increases the 
number of deaths. Because of its lower significance, this factor alone is not sufficient to 
explain the high death rate observed in the regions of the north. 
                                                 
47 Marin, (1921, p. 51). 




Table 4. OLS and Count Model (full model) 
  OLS NB GP 
AIC 58.8 1581.78 1581.78 
BIC 61.1 1605.85 1605.85 
Intercept 6.856*** 7.153*** 7.153*** 
Proximity 0.137* 0.084 0.084 
Border Area -0.269*** -0.227*** -0.227*** 
Potential Recruits  0.184*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 
Sailors 0.016** 0.013* 0.013* 
Density  0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
Small employers -0.313** -0.327*** -0.327*** 
Unemployment Rate 0.493*** 0.313 0.313 
Farmer 0.011** 0.006 0.006 
θ - 0.073*** 0.073*** 
Regions Obs. Dead Predicted by OLS Unexplained Dead2 (%) 
Aquitaine (++) 70271 53703 23.58 
Franche Comté (+++) 30292 39648 -30.89 
Note: * significant to 10%, ** significant to 5%, *** significant to 1%. (++) significant to 10%, (+++)significant to 5%.  
Source: « MdH » database and Census 1911. 
 
Out of the three regions listed as the most affected in the previous section (see table 3), 
we can now give an explanation for two of them: historic Brittany and Pays de la Loire. For 
the latter, it seems it is the criterion of rurality that is principally at work, whereas for historic 
Brittany, it is the rurality criterion combined with a very high regional unemployment rate. 
Among the regions identified as the most affected, only Aquitaine’s high death rate remains to 
be explained. With regards to Franche-Comté, the number of deaths expected is the closest to 
that observed: the “frontier” variable as well as the protection of its industrial fabric, explains 
the lower death rate here.  
In sum, our second model provides a better understanding of the number of deaths and 
improved our ability to predict this number. 
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Our last estimate (see table A2 in the appendix) introduces the variable ‘anti-militarist’ 
into the regression.49 By virtue of the endogenous nature of this variable, a probit model has 
been used to calculate the estimated probability that the department contains a high proportion 
of anti-militarist adherents.50 However, only the proportion of men aged 20–25 years has a 
significant and positive influence in favour of the anti-militarist movement (the Jaurès vote). 
Therefore, a problem of identification arises when we put the estimated probability into our 
regression concerning the number of deaths per department. Within this framework, we think 
that it is the functional form of the probit that identifies the econometric model. While we are 
conscious of the instability of this type of model, we think that the results obtained deserve 
comment. 
The first estimate presents the model with the variable ‘anti-militarist departments’ 
(that is, the regions of the north, centre, and south-east of France). As expected, the 
coefficient is positive, but is significant only at the 17 per cent threshold. By contrast, the 
second estimate introduces the estimated probability of a higher proportion of anti-militarism 
in a department (calculated from the probit model). This variable is highly significant and 
positive, indicating that the characteristics which positively influence the probability of being 
anti-militarist ultimately increase the number of deaths. This result is far from surprising since 
only young men seem to be anti-militarist, capturing the effects of our density and proximity 
variables, notably in the northern departments bordering on Germany which are marked by a 
high rate of anti-militarist sentiment. This suggests that the young population could have been 
anti-militarist because it saw that it would be the first to be condemned in the event of total 
mobilization. Overall, even if it must be kept in mind that this variable also captures the 
effects of density and proximity, we cannot exclude the possibility of a sanction against the 
anti-militarist vote. 
                                                 
49 Measured by a vote for the extreme Left greater than the average for French departments. 
50 Estimate available on demand from the authors. 
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These results must be set against those existing analyses that seek to capture the real 
weight of insubordination and its link to anti-militarism. In the paragraph on ‘The search for 
deserters or insubordinates and the discipline effort’, the Marin Report sets out some very 
interesting ideas with respect to these matters.51 The author provides annual statistics for 
desertions, abandonments of post, revolts, and rebellions, as well as a table summarizing the 
number and the nature of sentences pronounced by the war council (death – though bearing in 
mind possible commutation of the death penalty by the President of the Republic; forced 
labour for life; solitary confinement; imprisonment; fine). It seems that the highest number of 
judgments stemmed from the tribunals of Paris (Île de France) and Lille (Nord) – precisely 
those regions with the highest share of unexplained residuals. 
In the seventh part, we underline that the excess unexplained residual share of these 
deaths could to a large extent be due to chance localizations at the front at the onset of 
hostilities, at a time when the first regiments were made up on a regional basis and when the 
intensity of losses was the most severe. We thus suggest that the coincidence of localizations 
could have been necessitated by the structure of the railways as they existed in 1914, and that 
this in any case was the key to the distribution of troops in Plan XVII as drawn up by Joffre. 
 
VII. The random factor in the location of troops on the most deadly battles 
The Marin Report devotes a paragraph to ‘Losses per region’, wherein it notes 
 
the presence of certain bodies at times when the retreats of Morhange and 
Charleroi were particularly deadly and the use of certain units as attack troops, 
factors that provoked a quite large difference in losses per region, but that do not 
suffice to explain the overall difference in losses between such and such a region, 
but differences between such and such a commune within the same region or 
between neighbouring regions.52 
                                                 
51 Marin, (1921, p. 63). 




Rather than play down this argument, as the Marin Report seems inclined to do, it 
seems to us that in the explanation of the residual, this type of argument – the ‘timely’ 
circumstances of particularly deadly battles – could have a central place in the explanation of 
those high regional death rates not explained by our model. 
It helps to circumscribe this argument and to specify why it has not been possible for 
us to use it as an explanatory variable in our analysis. First of all, we do not have details of the 
years of death of the soldiers, and yet the first battles of 1914–15 (border battles, the race to 
the sea) were the most deadly. It follows that the regiments involved in these battles saw a 
higher death rate. This helps us to understand why this may translate into a high death rate for 
certain regions. First of all, it must be borne in mind that from the moment of widespread 
inscription – that is, 2 August 1914 – the regiments raised were on a regional basis (whereas 
afterwards this dimension was lessened, the priority becoming to replace the losses of these 
regiments) which amplified the shock wave of the first battles on the regional level. Being in 
the wrong place at the wrong time may translate statistically into a strong regional impact. 
According to table A3 in the appendix, the largest proportion of mutinies, as a 
function of the number of potential recruits, is observed in the case of Île de France. As 
previously discussed, the majority of mutinies coincided with the battles of Verdun and of 
Chemin des Dames. However, with regards to the mutinies of Verdun, these must be spread 
out in a proportional way for each region, since according to the orders of Marshall Pétain 
every regiment was to participate in this battle and then be reassigned to another front, as a 
measure to avoid the demoralization of the troops. However, this argument does not hold for 
Picardy and Aquitaine, which must have suffered other bloody battles at the start of the war. 
It remains, then, to identify the factors governing the localization of troops at the time 
war was declared: from an examination of sources from the military high command, it would 
appear that the mobilization plan as set out in Plan XVII played an essential role in the 
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provision of army corps (which at the start had a strong regional basis) in response to the 
German attack. Among the determining factors in the distribution of army corps to the front, 
the ‘railway network’ dimension played an essential role in the transportation of troops from 
their places of origin to the front.53 We now turn to trace the importance of these elements, 
while at the same time recognizing that these factors later lost their significance in part due to 
the movement of the front line and in part due to the re-composition of regiments on a non-
regional basis. Despite these caveats, it remains that these factors may bear on the period of 
the onset of hostilities, from August to October 1914, when there was a peak in the number of 
deaths, and so may explain why some regions ended up paying a higher price than others by 
virtue of the involvement of their regiments in the deadliest combat zones of the war.54 
What we call the ‘hidden variables’ of the unexplained residual share of our model can 
be explained partly by reference to Plan XVII and partly by the density of railway networks. 
As we shall see, these considerations determined the provision of troops at the time of 
engagement and ultimately influenced which regiments found themselves more ‘to the left’ or 
‘to the right’ of the front line (to adopt Joffre’s expression). 
The regional character of army corps is confirmed at the beginning of the war. As 
Pierre Miquel writes: 
 
the high command envisaged with great precision the railway facilities put at the 
disposal of troops coming from the interior: people from the north would go to the 
Ardennes, those from the west and from Paris on to Aisne and Verdun. The men 
of the south-west would disembark in Lorraine and in the Bar le Duc region. 
Those from the centre would go to the Vosges, those from the south to Mirecourt 
and Belfort. The bulk of supplies would be delivered after the 17th day of the 
mobilization, when all the troops would be in place, through the regulating 
                                                 
53 See Mémoires de maréchal Joffre. 
54 P. Miquel, (1995, p. 107), cites accounts of the clamour in the first hours of the war, which describe ‘the panic, 
the terror of the disconcerted, disabled, unprepared French troops. Under German firepower, some companies 
registered losses of 80%’. 
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railway stations (Gray, Is sur Tille, Châlons sur Marne, Troyes, Reims, and 
Laon).55 
 
Colonel Le Hénaff underlines the extent to which the challenge of communications 
was an essential element of command in the preparation for the war: ‘the enormous task that 
was the complete preparation of the transportation plan was the work of the 4th office, the 
organ for the preparation of the orders of the high command’.56 The central question was 
‘what distance to put between the assembly zone and the border (of combat)’.57 ‘All the flows 
of transport coming from different parts of the territory must terminate between Belfort and 
Mezières … it was not an easy thing, the French network having been constructed with Paris 
at its centre, from where all the major commercial flows stem, but without well-maintained 
cross-country lines … It was a matter of putting two-way flows into action with the same 
performance on all their sections’.58 
These considerations regarding the maintenance of territory and of transportation 
served as the basis of the plan for the assembling of troops as dreamed up by Joffre. In chapter 
ten of his memoires (‘La mise sur pied du plan XVII’), Joffre writes:59 
 
The 4th office had established that the assembly of active corps and reserve 
divisions on the north-east front would be accomplished along 10 separate lines of 
transport. The distribution of mobilized formations between different lines would 
be regulated in such a way as to cope sufficiently with the same load on each 
transport line. The proposed lines, spread between three beams, would terminate 
thus: three between Belfort and Toul, three between Toul and Verdun, four 
between Verdun and Hirson. These beams could be linked up to one another by 
several operational cross-country lines allowing the execution of alternatives. In 
particular, the cross-country route Dôle, Dijon, Paris, Creil, Tergnier could carry 
                                                 
55 Miquel, (1995, p. 47). 
56 Le Hénaff, (1922, p. 62). 
57 Ibid., p. 64. 
58 Ibid., p. 64. 
59 Joffre, (1932 p. 51). 
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out transfers from one transport line to another behind regulatory stations. Part of 
the available cargo could be brought to any point on this cross-country route – be 
it the Paris–Lyon line or the Bourbon line or even the Toulouse–Paris line … The 
assembly zones could thus be drawn backwards or moved forwards at will 
between the general line Laon–Soissons, Reims, Troyes, Dijon, Besançon and a 
front marked out by the course of the Meuse downstream from Pagny and that of 
the Moselle upstream from Toul. 
 
In the passage above, which in some respects points to the lack of preparation and the 
urgency of decisions, we also perhaps find an element which may help explain the as-yet 
unexplained high death rate. What explains the positioning of these regional regiments on the 
most deadly fronts in the first months of the war? It would seem that the main determinant 
arises from the problem of the economy of transportation, the use of the most direct rail routes 
to get to the frontlines. Therefore, part of the unexplained differences in the death rate 
observed between regions could be due to an unfortunate combination of chance and choice 
(contestable?) on the part of the military high command, in so far as the locations of the first 
German offensives were not those envisaged by the French high command. The railways 
certainly played a key role in the dispersal of regiments before the shock of the war set in. In 
this sense, the regional losses are in part results of the decisions of high command.60 While 
this variable allows us partly to reduce the uncertainty concerning the assignment zones of 
regional regiments at the start of the war, the location of the outbreak of the offensive was an 
unknown (at least, it was not known with any certainty), which means that the losses 
registered by the regions could to some extent be due to random factors.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
This study was carried out in order to explain regional disparities in the number of deaths 
during the Great War, by using new data from the MdH database. By cross-checking this data 
with that of the census, we find that demographic factors largely explain the distribution of 
the numbers of deaths during the Great War. However, some regions appear to have been 
                                                 
60 The question of whether the maintenance of the rail network was optimal in view of the preparations for the 
Great War and whether the decisions of the military high command were optimal in light of the distribution of 
the existing rail network (the adequacy of the assignment of transport to the troops and the existing network) is a 
matter for future research. 
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more affected (Pays de la Loire, historic Brittany, and Aquitaine) whereas other regions seem 
to have been more protected (Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur and Franche-Comté). 
By introducing the variables of economic activity and localization, we have been able 
to explain a large part of these differences. Pays de la Loire and historic Brittany would have 
given an additional contribution due to their rural nature, with the addition, for Brittany, of a 
less dynamic labour market. Taking account of these variables allows an overall reduction in 
the differences between regions, except for Aquitaine. We thus suggest that this unexplained 
difference is very probably rooted in the random nature of the assignment of regiments 
(constituted on a regional basis in the early years of the war, which were also the most 
bloody), combined with the location of German attacks, and thus of their greater or lesser 
participation in very deadly early battles. 
Finally, in light of our statistical results, the political hypothesis of a sanction against 
antimilitarist department cannot be rejected and deserves a nuanced conclusion: our last 
econometric model suggests that while the regions that were most marked by anti-militarist 
sentiment effectively had more deaths than the others, these regions were also the most 
densely populated, with the most youthful populations, and were, in some cases, the closest to 
the combat zones. Anti-militarist sentiment may thus reflect fears that it would be the young 
who would be mobilized first – a fear which, when fulfilled, meant that it was the regions 
with youthful populations who suffered the most massive losses. Overall, even if the political 
proxy captures these effects of youth, density and proximity, the possibility of a sanction 








Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables Description Mean σ Min Max 
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Dead Number of dead by area, dependent variable 14477 13227 1849 113615
Proximity Coded 1 if the area is in the combat zone 0.415 0.496 0 1 
Border Area Coded 1 if the area is bordering 0.195 0.399 0 1 
Potential Recruits  Potential Recruits in % 7.00 0.900 3.300 9.200 
Sailers Proxy of potential recruits in the navy 74.244 145.397 3 1034 
Density  Population per km2 73.592 64.331 15.485 444.226
Small Employers Coded 1 if the proportion of industrial executives is higher than workers  
0.085 0.281 0 1 
Unemployment 
Rate 
% of unemployment in the workforce 0.4 0.300 0.100 2.00 
Farmers Rate of farmers in the area 51.100 15.300 5.700 74.400 
Mutineers Number of mutineers in the region 107 124 8 543 
Source: « MdH » database,  Census 1911 and Marin report. 
 
 
Table A2. Anti-militarist Model 
  OLS 
AIC 58.8 10.8 
BIC 61.1 13.1 
Intercept 6.772*** 7.666*** 
Proximity 0.149* 0.077 
Border Area -0.256*** -0.238*** 
Potential Recruits  17.824*** 11.753*** 
Sailers 0.017** 0.010* 
Density  0.005*** -0.003** 
Small Employers -0.308** -0.319*** 
Unemployment Rate 51.111** 38.035** 
Farmers 1.251*** 0.726** 
Anti-militarist Proba. - 3.785*** 
Anti-militarist 0.154 - 





   
Table A3. Regional Mutineers 
Regions Number of mutineers for 10 000 soldiers 






Nord Pas de Calais 0,7
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Source: Marin report. 
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